Getting on in a varied world by Andreou, Chrisoula
Are greed and ruthlessness contrary to reason? Is immorality a form of 
irrationality? Much of contemporary ethical theory is a debate between 
Kantians, who argue that the dictates o f morality are dictates o f reason, 
and Humeans, who argue that reason is neutral between morality and 
immorality. The Kantian and Humean positions assume that the above 
questions can be answered uniformly for all possible rational agents. Re­
cently, however, the Aristotelian view that the dictates o f reason can vary 
depending on the agent’s species has gained some ground. If such varia­
tion is possible, then it might be that greed and ruthlessness are contrary 
to reason for agents o f a certain species, rationally required for agents of 
another species, and rationally optional for agents o f yet a third species.
The idea that the dictates o f reason can vary depending on the agent’s 
species is related to Aristotle’s view that whether something counts as a 
defect for a certain individual depends on what natural kind the individ­
ual belongs to. This position concerning evaluation makes room for the 
idea that immorality can be a defect o f the will for one kind of reflective 
creature without being a defect of the will for another kind of reflective 
creature, just as flexibility can be a physical defect for one kind of plant 
without being a physical defect for another kind of plant.
The nature o f species-based evaluation has been elaborated on by Mi­
chael Thompson.1 Based on this elaboration and on some observations
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1. Introduction
‘One of Thompson’s aims is to show that the Aristotelian picture is not committed to 
complete empiricism when it comes to our knowledge of natural-kind facts. He maintains 
that “human beings are characteristically in possession of some general substantive 
knowledge of the human life form which is not founded empirically on observation of 
members of their kind” (Michael Thompson, “Apprehending Human Form,” in Anthony 
O’Hear (ed.), Modern Moral Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004), pp. 47-74, at pp. 57-58; my emphasis). We have, he claims, “knowledge by reflec­
tion of some of the powers characteristic of the form we bear” (p. 72). For example, “of 
Martians I may perhaps recognize by empirical study, through my telescope, that they 
possess the powers of conceptual thought and concept-governed action ... But it seems I, 
as a human, may reach the same general facts about the specifically human form without 
a telescope” (p. 71).
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concerning the human predicament that are familiar from the work of 
Elizabeth Anscombe, Philippa Foot has developed the first sustained 
contemporary defense o f the view that immorality is a “natural defect” of 
the will for human beings.2 There is, as Foot would agree, no denying 
that examples o f immorality abound and that it is only the lucky among 
us that get away with merely hearing about, rather than experiencing 
firsthand, some of the worst that human life has to offer. Still, according 
to Foot, there is a sense in which immorality is not part of human nature, 
but is rather a (perhaps widespread) deviation from it—a sort of non­
physical deformity. Foot’s position, in a nutshell, is that the dictates of 
reason are determined by the workings o f a properly functioning will, 
which in the case of human beings is a morally good will. This position 
combines a theoretical point about practical reason in general— namely, 
that the dictates of reason are species-relative—with a substantive point 
concerning human nature in particular—namely, that for human beings 
natural goodness implies moral goodness. My focus will be on the latter 
point (though my arguments in section 3 will also address the more gen­
eral idea that the standards for a properly functioning will— and so the 
dictates of practical reason—are uniform within a single rational species).
The core argument in favor o f the view that immorality is a “natural 
defect” of the will for human beings, which I will examine shortly, is, I 
will argue, defective. It ignores certain possibilities concerning human 
nature that cannot, given nature’s ingenuity, reasonably be ignored. Note 
that I will not harp on how immoral people can be, or even how common 
immorality is. That, as both Thompson and Foot would stress, is not nec­
essarily to the point when it comes to the question of whether immorality 
is part of human nature or a deviation from it, since defects can be quite 
common.
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2For a version of “ethical naturalism” that is inspired by but also differs from Foot’s, 
see Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), part 
III). A crucial difference between Foot’s position and Hursthouse’s position is that, 
unlike Foot, Hursthouse defends the view that human nature is “harmonious” in that natu­
ral goodness and eudaimonia go hand in hand. (A view along these lines is also defended 
by Martha Nussbaum, “Aristotle on Human Nature and the Foundations of Ethics,” in 
J.E.J. Altham and Ross Harrison (eds.), World, Mind, and Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), pp. 86-131.) For a critique of the view, see Bernard Williams, 
“Evolution, Ethics, and the Representation Problem” (1983), reprinted in Making Sense 
o f Humanity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), chap. 9; Ethics and the 
Limits o f  Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), chap. 3; “Re­
plies” in Altham and Harrison (eds.), World, Mind, and Ethics, pp. 183-224. Though 
there are important differences between Foot’s position and Hursthouse’s position, Hurst­
house’s positive argument in favor of the view that immorality is a natural defect of the 
will for human beings is essentially the same as Foot’s. The argument will be described 
in section 2.
2. Species-Based Evaluation
In describing species-based evaluation, Foot relies on Thompson’s claim 
that when it comes to living things, we can make general judgments that 
are not properly understood as statistical judgments. Examples of such 
judgments, which Thompson labels Aristotelian categoricals, can be 
found in field guides. Take, for example, the judgment “Bobcats have 
four legs,” which can also be expressed in the form “The bobcat has four 
legs.” If one found the judgment “Bobcats have four legs” in a field 
guide, it would clearly be a mistake to interpret the judgment as equiva­
lent to the universal “All bobcats have four legs.” It would also be a mis­
take to interpret the judgment as equivalent to the judgment “Most bob­
cats have four legs.” To see this last point, notice that the following in­
ference rule holds for Aristotelian categoricals: It follows from “Ss are 
F” and “Ss are G” that “Ss are F and G.” And, as Thompson points out, 
by “repeated application” of the above inference rule “we will presuma­
bly always be able to produce a true [Aristotelian categorical] involving 
a complex conjunctive predicate that is not true of any member of the 
kind denoted by its subject, living or dead.”3 Thompson’s succinct fol­
low-up remark, “I mean: nobody’s perfect,” points to the feature of Aris­
totelian categoricals that is crucial for Foot’s purposes, namely, that they 
ground species-relative evaluative judgments. For example, given that 
bobcats have four legs, where this is to be interpreted as an Aristotelian 
categorical, bobcats with three legs count as defective.
But how do we arrive at Aristotelian categoricals? Foot’s answer is 
that Aristotelian categoricals “have to do with the teleology of living 
things o f [the relevant] kind.”4 Suppose, for example, that one is wonder­
ing whether the proposition “Humans have chins” is an Aristotelian cate­
gorical. For Foot, to figure this out one must figure out whether chins have 
a “purpose” or “function” in human life, particularly with respect to the 
survival and reproduction of human beings. And, as is clear from Foot’s 
discussion, the human chin might have a purpose, in the relevant sense, 
without this purpose having been assigned to the human chin by someone.
As Foot and Thompson point out, a feature’s current function in the 
survival and reproduction of a certain kind of living thing may differ 
from the function it was selected to serve; and it is current functions that 
determine Aristotelian categoricals. Aristotelian categoricals are not, in 
other words, “hypotheses about the past.”5 So a feature’s function, in the
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3Michael Thompson, “The Representation of Life,” in Rosalind Hursthouse, Gavin 
Lawrence, and Warren Quinn (eds.), Virtues and Reasons: Philippa Foot and Moral 
Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 247-95, at p. 288.
4Philippa Foot, Natural Goodness (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), p. 31.
5See ibid., p. 40 n. 1; and Thompson, “The Representation of Life,” p. 294.
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sense that is relevant here, need not coincide with what one might label 
as its evolutionary function. Still, current function and evolutionary func­
tion will often coincide.
The idea that some evaluative judgments are species-based evalua­
tions is fairly familiar. It is, for example, standard to view judgments 
about the adequacy of an individual’s vision as species-relative. What is 
less familiar is Foot’s suggestion that reason-judgments are species- 
based evaluations. For Foot, reason-judgments are of the same logical 
type as evaluations of sight. Just as evaluations o f sight rely on natural 
norms concerning what makes for properly functioning eyes within a 
species, reason-judgments rely on natural norms concerning what makes 
for a properly functioning will within a species.
Moreover, for Foot, just as nearsightedness is a natural defect in hu­
man beings— a defect of the eyes— injustice is a natural defect in human 
beings— a defect of the will. And just as nearsightedness counts as a de­
fect in human beings because o f the function of sight in human life, in­
justice counts as a defect in human beings because of the function of co­
operation in human life. According to Foot, “we are social animals, we 
depend on each other as do wolves that hunt in packs.”6 So for human 
beings, at least in their current state of evolution,7 justice is “neces­
sary”—“we can’t get on without it.”8 Foot maintains that the same is true 
of morality in general.9 Propositions such as “Humans are cooperative” 
and “Humans are compassionate” count, therefore, as genuine Aristote­
lian categoricals. This, in short, is the core argument in favor o f the view 
that immorality is a natural defect for human beings.
There are two very different ways of challenging the picture devel­
oped by Foot, even if one is willing to accept the existence of natural 
norms. At the theoretical level, one can resist Foot’s equation o f a 
rational will with a naturally good will. If one’s purposes are well-served 
by one’s having a defective will, why think that having a defective will is
6Foot, Natural Goodness, p. 16.
7As Foot points out, her approach involves looking at “stills” in the “moving picture 
of the evolution of species” (ibid., p. 29).
8Ibid., pp. 16-17. It is this move in Foot’s reasoning that is most clearly influenced by 
Anscombe’s work, especially G.E.M. Anscombe, “On Promising and its Justice” (1969), 
reprinted in Collected Philosophical Papers: Metaphysics and the Philosophy o f Mind 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981), pp. 10-21.
9Hursthouse makes essentially the same point in On Virtue Ethics, where she says 
that “if to be a good, non-defective human being is to be endowed with those character 
traits that manifest themselves in seizing and enjoying whatever one wants, unconstrained 
by law and morality, and one’s desires have not been enriched and amended by any of the 
training that begins the inculcation of the (real) virtues, then a collection of good human 
beings do not have any law or morality, do not give their children any kind of moral 
training—and indeed, clearly do not bother about children at all, who, we must suppose, 
all die of neglect shortly after they are bom” (p. 252).
something that a rational human being must avoid? Perhaps human be­
ings, taken as a group, cannot get on without justice; but an individual 
human being can get on without being just, and it might serve her pur­
poses quite well to do so. At the substantive level, one can resist Foot’s 
picture o f the role of morality in human life. One might be sympathetic, 
for instance, with the Calliclean view that the morally good will is natu­
rally defective.10 Perhaps it is hierarchical power structures, rather than 
cooperation, that we humans cannot get on without.
My concern here is with the substantive claim that immorality is a 
natural defect for human beings. I am skeptical not because I find the 
Calliclean picture of the human predicament more plausible than the 
Footian picture, but because the Footian picture, like the Calliclean pic­
ture, results from ignoring certain possibilities that cannot reasonably be 
ignored, namely, the possibility of multiple naturally sound types and the 
possibility o f mixed naturally sound types. In the following sections, I 
will consider the possibility o f multiple and mixed naturally sound types, 
drawing primarily on Sarah Blaffer Hrdy’s work, which brings together a 
variety o f research that shows that multiple and mixed naturally sound 
types are not only possible, but actually occur in nature. Given the possi­
bility o f multiple and mixed naturally sound types, it may be that neither 
the moral individual nor the immoral individual is, to use an image from 
Thompson’s work, “a human bonsai.”"
3. The Possibility of Multiple Naturally Sound Types
Suppose there is a species of flying insect, call it the species o f bleekers, 
that is divided into two types: the far-seeing and the near-seeing. Though 
they differ in their visual abilities, neither far-seeing bleekers nor near- 
seeing bleekers are naturally defective. Whether a bleeker is far-seeing or 
near-seeing depends on what developmental path is triggered by early 
environmental cues. These cues prompt each bleeker to develop in a way
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10Michael Thompson stresses this point in “Apprehending Human Form,” though he 
places himself on the side of Foot, Hursthouse, and Anscombe. (One clarificatory point: 
Suppose one conceives of moral judgments as reason-judgments and reason-judgments as 
species-based evaluations. Suppose further that the Calliclean view is on the right track 
and that cooperativeness and compassion are natural defects while cruelty and ruthless­
ness are natural virtues. Then, though we can say, loosely speaking, that the morally good 
will is naturally defective, it is more accurate to say that any plausible candidate for a 
morally good will is naturally defective, and so terms like (un)just and (im)moral should 
be discarded because they implicitly presuppose (by hypothesis falsely) that cooperative­
ness and compassion are rationally endorsed virtues. For expository convenience and 
compactness, I will put this complication aside and allow for the loose way of speaking 
found above.)
"Thompson, “Apprehending Human Form,” p. 60.
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that is appropriate given its circumstances. This developmental flexibility 
is essential to bleeker survival and reproduction. So neither of the follow­
ing statements is true:
(1) All naturally sound bleekers are far-seeing.
(2) All naturally sound bleekers are near-seeing.
Still, it might be true that all naturally sound bleekers can see, just as it is 
true that all naturally sound bleekers can fly.
Next suppose there is a species of two-legged mammal, call it the 
species of shumans, that is divided into two types: the just and the unjust. 
Though they differ in their psychologies and habits, neither just shumans 
nor unjust shumans are naturally defective. Whether a shuman is just or 
unjust depends on what developmental path is triggered by early cues. 
These cues prompt each shuman to develop in a way that is appropriate 
given its circumstances. (This is not to say that responsiveness to early 
cues is sufficient for appropriate development. Conditions or reinforce­
ments necessary for progress along the developmental path must also be 
met.) This developmental flexibility is essential to shuman survival and 
reproduction. So neither of the following statements is true:
(1) All naturally sound shumans are just.
(2) All naturally sound shumans are unjust.
Now consider the following possibility: perhaps injustice in humans 
is like injustice in shumans, which is perfectly sound, as are both near­
vision and far-vision in bleekers. Even if justice plays a crucial role in hu­
man survival and reproduction, it does not follow that injustice is a defect 
in humans. For injustice may also play a crucial role in human survival and 
reproduction, in which case both justice and injustice are naturally sound 
in humans. It is hasty to assume that the injustice we find in the human 
world has no function in human life. Both justice and injustice may fig­
ure as “ways of making out that are in [the human] repertoire,” to use a 
phrase of Foot’s.12 And it may be that both ways of making out were se­
lected for in humans, both continue to play important roles in human life, 
and the current functions served by justice and injustice match the func­
tions they were selected to serve, which they continue to serve well.
The complication I have attempted to bring out can be summarized as 
follows: there may be multiple naturally sound character types. Consider, 
relatedly, the following real case of polyphenism, “the phenomenon of 
environmentally cued alternative phenotypes within the same population”:
12Foot, Natural Goodness, p. 15.
In the case of geometric moths, mothers hatch two broods of caterpillars each year. In 
nature, spring broods feed on the protein-rich pollen of the oak’s drooping flowers, called 
catkins. Long after these [flowers] have dropped from the trees, the second ... brood of 
caterpillars hatches. Since the catkins are gone, all that is left for summer caterpillars are 
tough mature oak leaves ...
Whereas pollen-eating grubs metamorphose into knobby, wrinkled caterpillars that 
resemble ... catkins, later-born [caterpillars] are ... utterly twiglike, blending in with their 
leafy dinner and once again fooling predators ...
Experiments [have shown] that the pathway taken by the genetically coded develop­
mental program is triggered by what the caterpillar eats in the first three days.13
The moral is that
in varied and unpredictable worlds there will be more than one way to survive and repro­
duce. Through the course of development, individuals adopt alternative strategies, mani­
fested either in their morphology and physical appearance or in their behavior. Resulting 
phenotypes depend on circumstances . . . 14
Reflection on the phenomenon o f polyphenism has led to interesting 
new hypotheses concerning certain purportedly pathological human 
types. Hrdy, for example, has boldly suggested that the traits that charac­
terize what we now call sociopaths may be naturally sound given certain 
conditions during infant development.15 With the help of environmental 
cues, an infant might come to “recognize” that the path of the sociopathic 
loner is the developmental path that is most “appropriate” given his 
situation. These cues will trigger the “appropriate” development.
Now it might be suggested that the cues that trigger sociopathic de­
velopment are cues indicating an abnormal environment. Perhaps the 
infant has no one to rely on but a neglectful mother. If it is only in ab­
normal situations that sociopathic development is triggered, this might be 
enough to warrant classifying sociopathic development as pathological, 
even if it is a naturally sound response. But what makes for an abnormal 
environment? Is an environment containing a neglectful mother necessar­
ily abnormal? What if  the mother’s neglect is prompted by a psychologi­
cal mechanism that plays a crucial role in human survival and reproduc­
tion? (I will return to this possibility later on.)
But my aim is not to show that the type sociopathic loner is a natu­
rally sound human type. Maybe it is; maybe it is not. My aim is to stress 
that the phenomenon of polyphenism makes room for the possibility that 
both the just individual and  the unjust individual are following paths ap­
propriate to their different conditions.
It is a mistake to disregard the possibility o f multiple naturally sound 
character types, just as it was a mistake for Aristotle to disregard the pos­
13Sarah Blaffer Hrdy, Mother Nature (New York: Ballantine Books, 1999), p. 73.
14Ibid., p. 74.
15See ibid., part III, section 23.
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sibility of multiple naturally sound physical types in his work concerning 
reproduction and the “proper [human] form.”16 Aristotle’s mistake is 
hard to miss, given his biologically absurd conclusion that women are 
defective men. Foot clearly wants no part o f this position. And yet, in 
disregarding the possibility o f multiple naturally sound character types, 
the core argument in favor o f the view that immorality is a natural defect 
for human beings incorporates essentially the same sort of mistake as the 
one Aristotle makes.
4. The Possibility of Mixed Naturally Sound Types
Things might be even more complicated than I have so far suggested. 
Suppose there is a species o f two-legged mammal, call it the species of  
chumans, for which it is true that all naturally sound chumans care for 
their healthy-seeming newborns but neglect or abuse their weak-seeming 
newborns. (These attitudes do not result from conscious calculation, but 
from the unconscious processing of cues that chumans have evolved to 
be emotionally responsive to.) Chumans can thus move between being 
maternal (or, more precisely, nurturing and protective) and being unma- 
temal. They are, relative to a contrast that Foot plausibly casts as central 
in behavioral ecology, mixed naturally sound types.17 (Here and through­
out this paper, I mean by a mixed type a type that is mixed relative to the 
familiar contrasting types with which Foot is concerned, such as mater­
nal versus unmatemal and just versus unjust.)
That mixed naturally sound types occur in nature is quite clear. Take 
maternal and unmatemal responses. Well-established research by David 
Lack on swallows, robins, and other birds suggests that naturally sound 
birds are neither purely maternal nor purely unmatemal.18 The idea that a 
purely unmatemal bird is not naturally sound seems right. After all, a 
purely unmatemal bird is not likely to have many surviving offspring. 
But why wouldn’t pure matemality be naturally sound? The answer is 
that the bird who “attempt[s] to rear every egg she produce[s], d[oes] not 
necessarily fledge the most chicks.”19 As such, survival and reproduction 
in many bird species calls for discrimination when it comes to maternal 
commitment. This explains why
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16See Aristotle, Generation o f Animals, in Jonathan Barnes (ed.), The Complete 
Works o f Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, vol. 1 (Princeton: Princeton Univer­
sity Press, 1984), pp. 1111-218, at p. 1185.
17See Foot, Natural Goodness, pp. 15, 29, where she considers the “neglectful parent.”
18See David Lack, The Life o f the Robin (London: H.F. and G. Witherby, Ltd., 1941); 
“The Significance of Clutch Size,” Ibis 89 (1947): 302-52; Ecological Adaptations for  
Breeding Birds (London: Chapman and Hall, 1968).
19Hrdy, Mother Nature, p. 30.
the same mother who bravely drove away a predator from her nest would not intervene to
protect the last-hatched chick from a less ferocious but more lethal enemy, its own older
sib. This was a highly discriminating mother, whose commitment to her young was con- 
• • 20 tingent on circumstances.
And it does not seem to be just birds that are discriminating. Hrdy con­
vincingly argues that “there is probably no mammal in which maternal 
commitment does not emerge piecemeal and chronically sensitive to ex­
ternal cues.”21 In our varied world, pure matemality is, for many kinds, 
including kinds whose young need care to survive, naturally unsound. 
(Foot is therefore going out on a limb when she asserts, in passing, that if 
a lioness is a neglectful parent— if, for example, she fails to feed her cub 
or teach it to hunt— she is thereby naturally defective.22)
Now the question is: Given that mixed naturally sound types can and 
do occur in nature, what reason is there to assume, as Foot does, that a 
naturally sound human cannot be both just and unjust? Perhaps both just 
responses and unjust responses fulfill important functions in human life, 
just as maternal responses and unmatemal responses fulfill important 
functions in chuman life.
It might be suggested, in defense of Foot’s picture and of the core 
argument in favor o f the view that immorality is a natural defect for hu­
man beings, that morality and immorality are not the sorts of things one 
can move back and forth between. This suggestion is, however, implau­
sible. Human beings are not consistent when it comes to being moral. We 
hardly need experiments to tell us that a single person can be compas­
sionate in one situation but indifferent or even cruel in another. We have 
all had bad days and bad moods leading to bad behavior. What is surpris­
ing is just how little it takes to affect our responsiveness to others. As an 
experiment by A.M. Isen and P.F. Levin shows, something as trivial as 
finding a dime in a phone coin return slot can greatly impact how likely 
it is that a person will stop to help another. In Isen and Levin’s experi­
ment, dime-finders helped paper-droppers at a rate o f 87.5%, whereas 
non-finders helped at a rate of only 4%.23 Of course, the contrast between 
(overly-)enthusiastic solicitousness and minding one’s own affairs is not 
nearly as dramatic or morally charged as the contrast between being 
compassionate and being cruel. Still, Isen and Levin’s experiment is
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20Ibid.,p. 31.
21Ibid.,p. 174.
22See Foot, Natural Goodness, pp. 15, 29. Hursthouse relies on the same problematic 
example in her discussion of naturalism (On Virtue Ethics, p. 199). And as Hursthouse 
explicitly recognizes, the position she shares with Foot is in trouble if it does not cohere 
with empirical facts (p. 240).
23See A.M. Isen and P.F. Levin, “Effect of Feeling Good on Helping: Cookies and 
Kindness,” Journal o f  Personality and Social Psychology 21 (1972): 384-88.
suggestive with respect to the impact of mood on responsiveness to others.
According to John M. Doris, this and similar experiments suggest that 
contingent circumstances play a huge role in determining behavior, and 
so the attribution of robust traits to individuals is problematic (at least 
given familiar trait taxonomies). Doris argues that “people will typically 
behave inconsistently with respect to the attributive standards associated 
with a trait, and whatever behavioral consistency is displayed may be 
readily disrupted by situational variation.”24 Whether or not Doris is right 
about the extent to which people exhibit cross-situational inconsistency, 
even those who see Doris as exaggerating grant the existence of some 
cross-situational inconsistency.25
Notice that Doris’s position allows that “individuals may exhibit be­
havioral regularity over iterated trials of substantially similar situations.” 
It thus leaves room for “temporally stable, situation-particular ‘local’ 
traits that are associated with important individual differences in behav­
ior.”26 But local traits can be very fine-grained. Just as a mother bird 
might be fiercely protective in certain situations while being completely 
indifferent in others,
a person might be repeatedly helpful in iterated trials of the same situation and repeatedly 
unhelpful in trials of another, surprisingly similar, situation ... Even seemingly inconse­
quential situational variations may “tap” different dispositions, eventuating in inconsis­
tent behavior ...21
Among the more extreme experiments that Doris appeals to in reinforc­
ing the importance o f situation is the Stanford Prison experiment. In this 
experiment, twenty-one well-adjusted male college students were con­
fined in a simulated penitentiary and randomly assigned the role o f pris­
oner or guard. Though the experiment was scheduled to last two weeks, 
it was terminated after six days. Things just got too ugly, as the follow­
ing excerpts from the diary o f a participant assigned to the role of guard 
make apparent:
Prior to start o f experiment
As I am a pacifist and non-aggressive individual, I cannot see a time when I might mal­
treat other living things.
On day five
This new prisoner, 416, refuses to eat. That is a violation of Rule Two: “Prisoners must 
eat at mealtimes,” and we are not going to have any of that kind of shit ... Obviously we
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24John M. Doris, Lack o f Character (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 
p. 24.
25See, for example, Gopal Sreenivasan, “Errors about Errors: Virtue Theory and Trait 
Attribution,” Mind 111 (2002): 47-68.
26Doris, Lack o f  Character, p. 25.
27Ibid.
have a troublemaker on our hands. If that’s the way he wants it, that’s the way he gets it. 
We throw him into the Hole [a small closet for solitary confinement] ordering him to 
hold greasy sausages in each hand. After an hour, he still refuses ... I decide to force feed 
him, but he won’t eat. I let the food slide down his face. I don’t believe it is me doing it. I 
just hate him more for not eating.28
Obviously, a bad situation can elicit not just negligent unresponsiveness 
to the plight o f another, but cruelty, even on the part o f a seemingly typi­
cal individual. This variability can take even the individual himself by 
surprise, since, if he assumes consistency with respect to familiar traits, 
his limited prior experiences may well lead him to an oversimplified pic­
ture of himself.
Notice that variability alone does not reinforce the possibility of 
mixed moral types. Presumably even the perfectly moral individual will, 
for instance, sometimes keep his promises and sometimes break them, 
since the virtue o f fidelity does not call for invariably keeping one’s 
promises. What reinforces the possibility o f mixed moral types is vari­
ability that cannot plausibly be interpreted as invariably reflecting moral 
goodness, such as shifts between clear cases o f compassion and clear 
cases of cruelty.
Now it might be objected that even if  mixed moral types occur in na­
ture, this is not a problem for Foot. For Foot allows, recall, that defects 
can be widespread. She can thus allow that most o f us are mixed moral 
types without giving up on the idea that mixed moral types are naturally 
defective. While this may suffice to show that Foot is not committed to 
an empirically inadequate moral psychology— and so suffice to save her 
from the objection Doris sees as undermining a big chunk of contempo­
rary ethical theory— Foot is still in trouble. For it cannot just be assumed 
that mixed moral types are naturally defective. There is, indeed, no rea­
son to accept that human survival and reproduction calls for pure moral 
types. Quite the contrary; given our varied world, the reasonable default 
view is that being a mixed moral type is naturally sound (not just typical) 
for humans, just as being a mixed parental type is naturally sound (not 
just typical) for at least some birds. This view is reinforced by the fact 
that we find sociobiologists seeking and finding plausible survival-and- 
reproduction-related functions not only for “nice” phenomena, like ma­
ternal love, but also for “nasty” phenomena like sex-selective infanticide 
by mothers.
The phenomenon of infanticide by mothers is examined in depth by 
Hrdy. Her work suggests that sex-selective infanticide is the product of
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28C. Haney and P. Zimbardo, “The Socialization into Criminality: On Becoming a 
Prisoner and a Guard,” in J. Tapp and F. Levine (eds.), Law, Justice, and the Individual 
in Society (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1977), pp. 207-9 (quoted by Doris, 
Lack of Character, p. 51).
selection, and there is no reason to doubt that the current function of sex- 
selective infanticide with respect to human survival and reproduction is 
the same as the function that it was selected to serve—and that it serves 
well—namely, promoting efficient parental investment. Human mothers 
usually give birth to a single baby at a time, which is bom after a lengthy 
gestation, and so a human mother cannot afford to be as discriminating 
as a bird with a large brood when it comes to deciding which of her 
young she will care for. Still there are ecological conditions in which it 
pays, in evolutionary terms, for a mother to vary her commitment to her 
infant on the basis of important physical attributes, or to avoid commit­
ment altogether.29 When, for example, an infant’s contribution to a 
mother’s reproductive success varies a great deal depending on whether 
the infant is male or female (as is often the case), it pays, other things 
equal, for the mother to vary commitment and care on the basis o f sex.30 
Sex-selective infanticide is, according to Hrdy, just an extreme form of 
differential investment based on differential contribution to reproductive 
success.31 And such differential investment seems like a paradigmatic 
example of a naturally sound, though often immoral, strategy.32
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29In some animals, selection seems to be at the heart of strategies even more extreme 
than infanticide. Hrdy points to golden hamsters, which prune their litters to fit with pre­
vailing conditions via the “time-honored maternal tactic” of investment-recouping canni­
balism (Mother Nature, p. 46).
30The reason an infant’s contribution to a mother’s reproductive success often de­
pends on the infant’s sex is that the variance in reproductive success of males and fe­
males differs.
31This natural selection explanation of sex-selective infanticide demystifies the exis­
tence of this form of infanticide in a way that the suggestion that sex-selective infanticide 
is the result of social pressure does not, for the former explanation, unlike the latter, holds 
promise with respect to the task of accounting for the existence of social pressure favor­
ing sex-selective infanticide. For horrible details and images of “efficient” sex-selective 
infanticide or neglect by parents or grandparents, see Hrdy, Mother Nature, chaps. 12, 13. 
The image of an emaciated five-month-old female dying of malnutrition next to her 
plump and healthy twin brother is especially striking.
Notice that the practice of infanticide can be fitness-promoting not only at the indi­
vidual level but also at the group level—given the right ecological conditions, groups that 
practice infanticide may fare better than groups that do not. So infanticide might be the 
result of selection both at the individual level and at the group level. For discussion con­
cerning the possibility and nature of group selection, see, for example, Robert Boyd and 
Peter J. Richerson, Culture and the Evolutionary Process (Chicago: University of Chi­
cago Press, 1985), chap. 7; “Group Selection among Alternative Evolutionarily Stable 
Strategies,” Journal o f  Theoretical Biology 145 (1990): 331-42; Elliott Sober and David 
Sloan Wilson, “Reintroducing Group Selection to the Human Behavioral Sciences,” Be­
havioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1994): 585-654; Unto Others (Cambridge, Mass.: Har­
vard University Press, 1998), chaps. 3-5; Kim Sterelny, Thought in a Hostile World (Ox­
ford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), chap. 7.
32Note that where differential investment is not just naturally permissible but natu­
rally required, there may well be particular cases in which there is no overlap between the
The core argument in favor o f the view that immorality is a natural de­
fect for human beings, which has been developed by Foot, assumes that 
if  justice and compassion have important functions in human survival 
and reproduction, then injustice and cruelty are natural defects in human 
beings. But this ignores possibilities and results that cannot reasonably 
be ignored. Multiple and mixed naturally sound types can and do occur 
in nature. Moreover, research in the life sciences suggests that at least 
some bad human behaviors, traits, or strategies are selected for and con­
tinue to have important survival-and-reproduction-related functions in 
human life. All this fits poorly with the position that immorality is a 
natural defect for human beings. Emerging as much more plausible is the 
competing view that, for human beings, natural soundness sometimes 
supports behaviors, traits, or strategies that conflict with (any ideal that 
can plausibly be called) moral goodness.33
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5. Conclusion
set of naturally sound options and the set of morally sound options available to an agent. 
We could still avoid the conclusion that immoral behavior is sometimes rationally re­
quired by rejecting the equation of a rational will with a naturally good will. More impor­
tantly, we could also work to eliminate situations in which there is no overlap between 
the set of naturally sound options and the set of morally sound options available to an 
agent. See n. 10 above for a clarificatory point concerning the idea that one might be 
rationally required to behave immorally.
33My thanks to Peggy Battin, Josh Gert, Elijah Millgram, Mariam Thalos, Mike White, 
and an anonymous referee for helpful comments on the ideas in this paper. The seeds of 
some of the arguments developed in this paper can be found in my review of Foot’s 
Natural Goodness in Utilitas 17 (2005): 359-61.
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